ATGM are unique in that, although they are deadly, some of them (especially early ones) move relatively slowly,
giving their intended targets a chance to react. One of the favorite tactics is to shoot at the
launching unit to either destroy it or degrade its aim. ATGM are thus treated slightly differently than other direct fire weapons
to give the defending units an opportunity for defending units to suppress, disorder, or knock out the firing unit
before these sub-sonic missiles hit.
ATGM weapon ratings are indicated by a Green background.
Units which use ATGM ratings in the friendly player turn invoke a special sequence of play:
ATGM Targets are designated in the offensive fire phase
After all normal Offensive direct fire is resolved, the defender gets a "Defensive Overwatch"
phase. Defending units are allowed to fire at the ATGM units which designated targets.
Any units which do this are considered to have used their defensive fire for the player turn, in a
similar way to those which fire against aircraft.
After defensive overwatch fire has been resolved, surviving ATGM units resolve their
fire against their designated targets
Units which use ATGM ratings in defensive fire resolve their fire
combat after all overwatch fire has been resolved.
Any disordered or suppressed result from the fire at a firing ATGM unit
takes effect before calculating the modifiers used in resolving the ATGM attack.
Naturally, if the firing ATGM unit is knocked out by this fire,
its attack is automatically treated as no effect.
For the period of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, October 6-9,
you might consider allowing Arab ATGM attacks to resolve their fire immediately,
just like other types of direct fire. The Israelis were caught completely off-guard by the ATGMs
at the beginning of the war, and it was after several disasterous unsupported
counterattacks that they learned the hard way how to deal with them.
The special rules given above reflect tactics everybody started to incorporate
after the Israelis lost so many tanks during the first four days of the war.
Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV)
Vehicles were developed specifically to allow their crews and passengers a better chance of surviving
if they hit a mine. This will be indicated in the notes section as +(N) MPV, where N is the number that
is added to the bail-out roll when a Troop unit attempts to dismount from such a vehicle
following a Suppress, Disorder or Knocked-Out caused by a minefield.
MPV were found in the South African Defence force of the '80s and '90s. They include the
Buffel, Casspir, Saxon, Bulldog, Hippo, Wolf Turbo and Rheebok.
Large Firing Signatures
In the standard spotting rules, units that open fire attract a +1 shift on the Spotting Table.
This is sufficient for conventional guns and smallarms, but some post-WW2 weapons such as Recoilless Rifles,
Surface-to-Air Missiles and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles often have unusually large firing signatures.
Weapons that have unusually large firing signatures have a note such as '+2 spot ATGM' or
'+3 spot SAM' marked on their card. This means that when these weapons are fired,
they attract a +2 or +3 shift on the Spotting Table INSTEAD OF the usual +1 (NOT in addition to the +1).
Weapons such as 105mm+ Recoilless Rifles, first-generation ATGMs and most SAMs will get the +3,
while smaller Recoilless Rifles (e.g. US 75mm or Soviet 82mm) and more modern ATGMs (e.g. MILAN, AT-5 or TOW) will get +2.
Note that common sense needs to be applied.
For example, a BMP or Bradley would only attract the spotting modifier when firing their ATGMs.
Similarly, a SAM team firing smallarms at infantry would only attract a +1 spotting modifier.
Changes To Hull-Down Rule
There are two major factors affecting going Hull Down that have become more prevalent since the end of WW2:
First, is the necessity for larger and larger guns in tanks, while balancing this against the need to reduce the tank's profile. The Soviets
in particular, considered that keeping their tanks low in profile was of vital importance when pursuing their primarily offensive doctrine.
The resultant low turret profiles in Soviet tank designs meant that the gun's breech could not raise very far,
thus preventing the gun from being depressed to any great degree.
This then means that these tanks are very difficult to get into a hull-down position,
where the ability to depress the gun is of vital importance. This was not something that bothered
the Soviets very much, whose primary concerns were highly-mobile big guns behind thick armour.
These tanks have their cards marked with a note such as '-2 Hull Down Check', which is to be
applied to the die roll when attempting to go hull down.
By way of contrast, NATO doctrine was for most of the Cold War, primarily defensive in nature.
Therefore, a great emphasis was placed upon being able to fight from hull-down positions and many NATO tank designs
increased the turret mask armour, while simultaneously reducing hull armour to keep the weight down.
These tanks therefore have a note such as '-2 Hull Down DF Mod', which means that their Hull-Down
defensive modifier is -2 rather than the usual -1 (note that these modifiers are not cumulative).
There are some oddities, such as the T-55, which is bad at being able to go hull-down,
but does have thicker turret armour when it does eventually find a hull-down position.
Finally, we have ATGM vehicles. When these are hull-down, they are often presenting only a very small
weapons mounting rather than a turret per se. Therefore, these vehicles also often have a Hull Down DF Modifier
due to their small target profile when hull-down.
Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicles
Some APCs in the modern era were designed with the MICV concept in mind - that the infantry should be able to
fight from their vehicles while mounted. Firing ports and/or infantry-operated weapons were therefore fitted.
These vehicles have a note such as '+1 CC Inf Pass' listed on their card.
This means that if at least one infantry unit is left mounted in the vehicle, the vehicle will gain an
additional +1 Close Combat modifier against TGsV units (but not V units).
The Uncertainty Principle
With the enormous theoretical power of some modern weapons such as tank guns firing APFSDS and ATGMs,
there will be occasions when the firing factors come out at +10 or more and the result will be an automatic kill.
However, real combat is never that straightforward - often military hardware can go wrong at the most inopportune times and history
is littered with such examples. For example, at the first battle on the Lomba River in Angola 1987, a South African Ratel ZT-3
fired three missiles at Angolan T-55s in quick succession - the first two missiles went 'wild' and soared straight up,
while the third exploded as it hit an unfortunate Angolan soldier who stood up into the flight path of the missile!
The next six missiles all hit their targets, with three T-55s destroyed and two more damaged.
On paper and on the range, all six missiles 'should' have hit their targets.
To represent these unpredictable intangibles, any unmodified '1' rolled during fire combat resolution will automatically have no effect on the target.
In the case of ATGMs and aircraft attacks, there is a whole heap of high technology to go wrong (multiplied by a high workload for the crew)
and an unmodified roll of '1' or '2' will have no effect.
Toss-bobming
This 'lofting' technique was developed by the RAF and was later adopted by many other air forces -
used in conjunction with laser-guided bombs it became a deadly weapon of Coalition forces during the First Gulf War.
The technique was also used highly effectively with 'dumb' bombs by SAAF squadrons operating Mirage F1 AZ
aircraft during the latter stages of the Bush War in Angola. The technique requires very
specialised bombsights and training, but a skilled crew can accurately place an unguided bomb within a 100m circle from over 5km away.
The advantages of Toss-Bombing are:
It greatly reduces the risk to aircraft from dense SAM/AAA defences.
It can be delivered from a low altitude, thus reducing exposure to the enemy radar umbrella and associated air defence fighters.
The disadvantages are
It requires very specialist equipment and training to do with any semblance of accuracy
It is rarely as accurate as conventional bombing (unless using LGBs).
Toss-bombing Rules
Toss-Bombing (or 'Lofting') is called in during the Close Air Support Phase,
though the aircraft never appears on the table. Using special ballistic bombsights, the aircraft
'lofts' the bombs several kilometres from the target. It can therefore be thought of as air-delivered artillery fire.
SAM units with a range greater than 100 inches are the only units that may engage
aircraft engaging in Toss-bombing, so only these units may conduct anti-aircraft fire before
resolving the Toss-Bombing attack.
An aircraft engaging in Toss-Bombing may only launch one single attack
(delivering all its bombs in one go from long range and then scooting back to safety
at low level and high speed). It may not launch a second attack and may not return for a strafing run.