




7. Flieger Div.

10 MAY 1940




- a) Sturmabteilung Koch was the special detachment most famous for the Eben Emael capture. While technically part of 7 Flieger Division, this unit operates separately.
- b) The second regiment was without commander or staff at this period.
- c) Non 'Battlefront' combat units included for completeness and interest





(a) The two guns of the Leichtgeschütze battery may also operate as separate unit attachments.

(b) When operating as attachment to Regiment, use as direct support



Notes

d) The anti tank companies and the light flak had a total of 12 weapons broken into 3 batteries and further broken down into pairs. This gives 6 firing stands which probably reflects better on the tactical deployment of these weapons. Feel free to reduce the number of firing stands depending on preference and tactical situation.

e) Guns may operate as separate unit attachments

f) As Divisional assets, these units should normally attached to other manoeuvre elements with the possible exception of Oberleutnant Langguth's bicycle company.

Company Commanders (h)

FJR 1

1. Gotte
2. Groschke
3. Brandis
4. Gericke
5. Straeler-Pohl
6. Stangenberg
7. Pagels
8. Bohmler
9. Gessner
10. Specht
11. Becker
12. Schmidt


FJR 2

1. Schlichting
2. Merten
3. Von Roon
4. Morawetz
5. Thiel
6. Schirmer
7. Zimmermann
8. Paul

(h)

Companies are numbered from 1 to 14 within the regiment. Companies 4, 8 & 12 are Fallschirm-MG-Kompanie containing the heavy machine guns and mortars. Company 13 should be infantry guns although this unit was not operational in May 1940. Company 14 is regimental anti tank.

Sturmabteilung Koch



General comments on 7 Flieger Division

Quality – Experienced for the majority of the division with Gruppe Beton, Eisen and Stahl from Sturmabteilung Koch being Veterans and Gruppe Granit, Elite. At a time when the majority of the world's forces would be rated as Trained or Raw, the Fallschirmjäger are still a highly trained and motivated formation even considering the general lack of combat experience. Deployment in Poland was largely as airfield garrison and completely as leg infantry and the units deployed in Denmark and Norway either came and conquered without any significant combat or were still locked in bitter fighting in northern Norway when the invasion of Holland took place.

The men of Sturmabteilung Koch had been picked from volunteers within the division and had been training for their missions since November 1939 with the specialised assault engineering work practiced on Polish fortifications at Gleitwitz.

Deployment – Sturmabteilung Koch was exclusively deployed using DFS 230 assault gliders. The rest of the division was either para dropped or airlanded by Ju52 as a second wave. 7 Fallschirmgeschützbatterie and the PaK units were para capable but airlanded during the Holland campaign. The division light flak, signals, medical and motorcycles all seemed to be deployed by airlanding only and the author is uncertain about the bicycle units from 7 Aufklärungsstaffel but leans towards airlanding.

Generalleutnant Student joined his division in Rotterdam after being flown into Waalhaven airfield towards the end of the battle and managed to be accidentally shot by SS troops.

Technology and Tactics - German parachutes were more primitive than the equipment used by US and British forces later in the war. They were fastened using a four point harness over the ineffective jump smock the jagers wore. A Jäger on landing (assuming of course he had survived the slightly painful face first landing position the harness system forced upon him) after managing to release his parachute without being dragged along the ground, was forced to struggle out of his smock to get to his webbing belts underneath. Then, since the smock still held pockets of useful equipment, was forced to struggle back into it again. At this stage the jager was unfortunately still only armed with a pistol and grenades or at best a SMG as anything heavier would overload the primitive parachute. Weapons such as rifles, MG34 LMGs and mortars were dropped in stowage containers and needed to be recovered.

These containers were normally carried in the external bomb shackles of the Ju52 and released as the men jumped and so should be relatively nearby but gamblers may decide to force stands to use GE.46 Commander factors until they can successfully rearm.

Germans unlike the Western Allies did not jump at night. Navigation levels were not deemed high enough to allow a concentrated deployment of airborne units at night so all training and combat jumps were made during daylight. These jumps, due to one of the few advantages of the parachutes used, could be made as low as 100m. This low altitude gave about 60 seconds of falling time, a factor which reduced exposure to ground fire and helped to reduce scatter due to drifting – a factor important considering the parachutes were next to impossible to steer. Still air dispersal of a 12 man squad would be 200m.

The 7.5cm Skoda GebK15 weapons were a WW1 era mountain gun that could be air dropped in seven loads. Unfortunately since each load weighed differently they drifted at different rates causing mild annoyance to the gun crews who then had to go find them all. It is probably for these reasons the weapons were flown in Holland during this campaign, rather than risk the parachutes. A more modern but less successful 7.5cm weapon was issued to the division in early 1940 but proved so disappointing when they were trialed in Norway that the older GebK15 were used in Holland instead.

Sources

German Airborne Divisions – Blitzkrieg 1940-41, Bruce Quarrie, Osprey Publishing

German Army Handbook 1939-1945, W.J.K.Davies, Military Book Society

The Armed Forces of World War II, Mollo, Orbis Publishing