

Initial set up of the Honey Hill scenario. Game hosted by Josh Beck and the Army Group York Club. Photo by Miles Reidy.



"Hatch, why in hell didn't you flank them on their right?" -MG William T. Sherman.

Union Strategic Objective. In early November 1864, Union MG William T. Sherman was in Atlanta, Georgia, the city he captured in early September, finalizing plans for his next campaign. He was determined to march his "army right through the South" as "proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest". The plan Sherman proposed and won approval for was a route of march from Atlanta to "the seashore at Charleston (South Carolina) or Savannah (Georgia)".

Union Operational Objective. On 11 November 1864, Sherman requested support for his campaign by telegraphing Union Chief of Staff, MG Henry W. Halleck in Washington, D.C. He stated, "I would like to have (Major) General (John G.) Foster (commander of the Union's Department of the South) to break the Savannah and Charleston (rail) road about Pocotaligo (South Carolina) about 1 December." The Savannah to Charleston railroad was the line of supply and communication for the twin objectives of Sherman's campaign. The first objective was to break the 102-mile long railroad to interrupt supplies and reinforcements that could reach the enemy on his front and the second was to cut the rail line to prevent the escape of Confederate LTG William J. Hardee's 10,000-man force defending Savannah.

Unfortunately, Halleck muddled Sherman's clear and succinct request when he passed it on to Foster. Writing to Foster, Halleck said Sherman "wishes you, if possible, to cut the Savannah and Charleston Railroad" but then Halleck added the muddle, "at all events a demonstration on that road will be of advantage". A military demonstration implies a threatening move toward an enemy position but not necessarily the occupation of the position. A demonstration is used to pin enemy forces in place and/or draw reinforcements away from the true objective. The ever-cautious Halleck had subtly altered Sherman's request, reducing it to a less ambitious and less decisive objective.



The Union Force Assembles, Sails, and Deploys. Foster, with the help of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, quickly organized a force - The Coast Division - that included 5,000 soldiers and about 500 Sailors and Marines under the command of Union BG John P. Hatch. The division and brigades were provisional organizations made up of hastily assembled units stationed along the Atlantic Coast from Charleston to Florida. The Coast Division sailed on 27 November 1864 from Morris and Folly Islands near Charleston and headed for Hilton Head, South Carolina. The division rendezvoused with other troops at Hilton Head and then departed in the early morning of 29 November up the Broad River. The plan was to disembark at Boyd's Landing, march the nine miles to the Savannah and Charleston Railroad located one mile beyond Grahamville (present-day Ridgeland), South Carolina and then physically occupy the railroad, tear up the tracks, burn railroad buildings and destroy nearby railroad bridges.

The "Friction and Fog of War" quickly destroyed the Union plans for 29 November. Early morning fog delayed the start of the convoy and hampered efforts to locate and land at Boyd's Landing. Once ashore, the Union's lack of accurate maps and inept (or devious) local guides lead to aimless marching and counter-marching throughout the day. Union soldiers, sailors and marines marched up to fifteen miles throughout the day and into the night only to advance a total of three miles toward the railroad, ending the day still seven miles short of their objective and the Coast Division missed its best opportunity to reach the Savannah and Charleston Railroad virtually unopposed.

The Confederate Response. Fortune however, smiled on the Confederates throughout the 29th because the only units available to oppose the Union's 5,500-man Coast Division were small vedettes of the 3rd SC Cavalry (246 men) dispersed to guard possible landing sites and four batteries of artillery (415 men) deployed to guard the three avenues of approach to Grahamville. The Confederates used this reprieve to hastily organize a defensive force to oppose the Union incursion.

The defense of the Savannah and Charleston Railroad was the responsibility of the 3rd South Carolina Military District Commander, LTC Charles J. Colcock. Alerted by the vedettes, the 32nd GA and 47th GA Regiments from Charleston were ordered by Hardee (in Savannah) to Grahamville via the Savannah and Charleston Railroad. BG Charles Chestnut's 350-man SC Reserve Regiment in Augusta, Georgia was ordered to Grahamville but would not arrive until midnight on the day of battle while BG Lawrence S. Baker's 1,960-man NC Brigade traveling from North Carolina would began arriving the day after the battle just before daybreak. The nearest infantry units that could reach the area in time were the 1,880-man GA Militia Brigades and Battalions under the command of MG Gustavus W. Smith, presently on a train heading for Savannah. Smith's entire GA Militia Division was scheduled to make the trip to Savannah but a lack of rolling stock prevented all but two brigades and two battalions from making the journey. The train carrying the GA Militia units arrived in Savannah at 0200 on the day of battle. Aware of the emergency, Hardee ordered the GA Militia units to continue the 50-mile train ride from Savannah to Grahamville.


At first, Smith resisted at sending his Georgia troops beyond the borders of his state to fight in South Carolina. Smith's GA Militia Division had recently fought a disastrous battle on 22 November where they made a frontal assault on Sherman's entrenched veteran rearguard at Griswoldville, Georgia. Smith's Division suffered more than 600 casualties to the Union's 95. His troops were exhausted traveling from Macon, Georgia to Savannah. The direct path blocked by Sherman's forces, the circuitous journey entailed a rail journey of 95 miles, a 55mile road march in 54 hours and then another 200-mile rail journey to reach Savannah. After Hardee explained the situation, Smith consented and continued on the 50-mile train ride to Grahamville but without prior approval to remove his GA Militia units from the state. Later, Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown approved of the deployment after learning the details.

On the morning of the battle, Wednesday, 30 November 1864, Confederate forces formed around Grahamville and the nearby Savannah and Charleston Railroad Depot. Colcock planned to be married this day but left his bride to be in Savannah the night before. Accompanied by elements of the 3rd SC Cavalry, he rode nearly 50 miles to arrive in Grahamville at 0700. In addition, other elements of the 3rd SC Cavalry and artillery were arriving from various points and at 0800 elements of Smith's GA Militia began arriving by train from Savannah. The 47th GA also arrived by train from Charleston in time to march to Honey Hill and form on the Confederate right flank between 1100 and 1200. BG Robertson's reinforcements arrived on the field at 1630 as the battle sputtered to a halt. They were held as a reserve in case the battle resumed.

Smith arrived at 0800 and put Colcock in charge of selecting and preparing the most advantageous defensive position to engage the Coast Division. Colcock was an inspired choice--before the war he was a local planter, had founded the Savannah & Charleston Railroad he was defending and was intimately familiar with the area of operations.

Confederate Delaying Actions. Colcock chose to delay the Union forces by deploying two companies of his 3rd SC Cavalry and two Napoleons of LT Zealy's artillery section on the Grahamville Road east of Honey Hill. The Coast Division was methodically advancing along the Grahamville Road as they finally discovered the correct route to the railroad. Fighting an inspired delaying action from three different defensive positions, the small Confederate force delayed the enemy for two and one-half critical hours, allowing the GA Militia and SC Artillery units time to occupy and prepare the Honey Hill fortifications shortly before the arrival of the advancing Coast Division.

Honey Hill - Confederate Main Line of Defense. The site Colcock chose as his main line of defense was an old position of fortifications at Honey Hill, located three miles east of Grahamville. The mile-long fortifications were constructed when Gen. Robert E. Lee commanded the area from November 1861 through February 1862. Two artillery redoubts were built, rifle-pits were constructed on both flanks and trees were



cleared from the front of the improved positions to provide clear fields of fire. The fortification was not maintained since 1862 but it had not deteriorated and was still viable.

Colcock ordered the bridge on the Grahamville Road over Euwah Creek dismantled as his troops finished preparing the fortified position just minutes ahead of the Union advance. He then informed Smith that all was in readiness and tendered his resignation from further command, as Smith was the senior commander on the field. Smith replied, "No, Colonel, you have prepared so fine an entertainment that you must receive your guests."

The Confederate position was strong in the center but weaker on the flanks. The Honey Hill artillery redoubt was an open earthwork with embrasures for four guns and extended two hundred feet on each side of the Grahamville Road. The terrain immediately in front of the artillery redoubt was comparatively open. At 150 yards to the front, the shallow, sluggish Euhaw Creek (two feet deep and 20 yards wide) opened up into a marsh on both sides with a heavy growth of trees and dense underbrush that ran along the frontage of the entire position. The obvious approach to the Confederate position was by the Grahamville Road but the Union commanders were completely unaware of the existence of the earthworks despite the fact they were built over two years ago.

For the past day and a half, Hatch and the Coast Division were opposed by small skirmishing elements of the 3rd SC Cavalry and at times, two guns. In each action, the Confederates were either repulsed as they skirmished along the line of communication leading to Boyd's Landing or fought a delaying action as the Federals advanced along the Grahamville Road, but the situation was about to change.

The Battle of Honey Hill - Tactical Level. The Grahamville Road approaching the Confederate position made a sharp turn to the left as it passed through the thick forest and swamp. The improved positions were nearly invisible to the Federals as they entered the turn and advanced along the road in march column. At 1100 the Federal column rounded the turn and the Confederates opened fire on the column with canister and musketry. The Union troops were repulsed and The Battle of Honey Hill had begun.

Hatch spent the next hour forming a line of battle with BG Potter's 1st Brigade on either side of the Grahamville Road and drove the Confederate skirmishers from the thick woods back into their improved position. Then about noon, regimental commanders on their own initiative began to make uncoordinated and mostly unsupported attacks on the Confederate works. These attacks continued through out the afternoon.

The 35th United States Colored Troops (USCT) regiment made one charge up the Grahamville Road to Honey Hill unsupported and was repulsed. Then the 55th MA (Colored) regiment also charged up the Grahamville Road to Honey Hill thrice, each time with 5 of 8 companies in field column. Only the second assault received a supporting charge on their left flank from the 127th NY. All three of the charges were repulsed. The 25th OH regiment charged once unsupported on the Confederate rifle-pits north of Honey Hill and was repulsed. Each assault was repulsed and defeated in detail as the Confederates were allowed to sequentially concentrate their firepower on one Union attack at a time. Between and during these assaults, the front line Union regiments engaged the Confederate position with small arms firefights. The Confederates noted that the Union up-hill fire usually passed over their heads and did little damage while their down-hill fire was much more effective.


Adding to the confusion of battle, Col Hartwell's 2nd Brigade (Colored) arrived on the field and was thrown in behind Potter's 1st Brigade as unneeded supports instead of being deployed as a tactical maneuver element to turn the Confederate position. Command, control and communication (C3) in the thick forest and swamp was difficult enough without further eroding C3 the by intermingling the two brigades with one another.

The Union artillery was actively employed throughout the day. Battery B, 3rd NY was unlimbered at the "Crossroads" of the Grahamville and Wood roads. This crossroads was the only place where Union artillery could easily target Honey Hill. The forest was thick and the enemy was invisible until they fired. Union guns, on lower ground, aimed at the discharge of smoke from Confederate guns firing from Honey Hill that were viewed over the intervening tree branches. Union artillery at the crossroads often fired over their own infantry to hit targets on Honey Hill. Battery F, 3rd NY later replaced Battery B, 3rd NY when Battery B began to run low on ammunition. Both New York batteries were engaged from 1100 to 1600, when their ammunition was nearly exhausted. At 1600 they were replaced with the six-gun Naval Battery that continued to fire until dark.

The after action reports mention the Spencer-armed 4th MA Cavalry Company activities during the battle. They apparently scouted the road network north of the battlefield to protect that flank and perhaps find an avenue of approach to turn the enemy's flank. The 1st NY Engineer detachment was tasked with repairing the docking facilities at Boyd's Landing to expedite the unloading of troops and supplies. Meanwhile, the 26th and 32nd USCT, elements of the 54th MA and 102nd USCT, Battery A, 3rd RI and a section of the Naval Battery guarded the line of communication back to Boyd's Landing.

Union Defeat and Withdrawal. At dusk (1720) the Union retreat commenced. The Union forces skillfully withdrew by defensive bounds covered by infantry and artillery and took most of their wounded and equipment with them. The 127th NY and 102nd USCT along with one section of the Naval Artillery formed the rear guard and remained at the front, keeping up a slow fire with artillery. By 1930 the main body of the Coast Division was beyond pursuit and the rear guard withdrew. There was no Confederate attempt at pursuit - the troops were too exhausted from the long trip to the battlefield and the ensuing battle.

Casualties reflected the results of the battle as the GA Militia avenged the Battle of Griswoldville. The Coast Division reported casualties of 88 killed, 623 wounded (of which 147



were slight wounds), and 43 missing for a total of 754. LTC Charles C. Jones Jr., in his book Siege of Savannah, claims Confederate loses of 4 killed and 40 wounded (not all units reporting their casualties). The day following the battle a Savannah newspaper (Republican) stated, " Our loss was between 80 and 100 killed and wounded." In his after action report, Smith wrote, "Our loss in every arm of service was 8 men killed and 42 wounded." If the higher casualty figure is used (more reasonable) then the Confederate casualties represent 4% (100 / 2,680) of the committed force and only 13% (100 / 754) of Union casualties.

Participant Assessment of the Battle. Hatch, the Coast Division commander, wrote, "The affair was a repulse owing entirely to the strong position held by the enemy and our want of ammunition." Potter, commander of the 1st Brigade, wrote about his troops, "Nothing but the formidable character of the obstacles which they had to encounter prevented them from achieving success."

Not surprisingly, Union Officers in junior commands held a different view. CPT Soule, 55th MA in his account of the battle says, "The generalship displayed was not equal to the soldierly qualities of the troops engaged. There appears to have been a lack of foresight in the preparations." CPT Luther B. Mesnard, commander of B Company, 25th OH, wrote in his diary, "Our troops were badly handled, no generalship, strategy or tactics. As a diversion in Sherman's favor the fight may have amounted to a little, but nothing to what it would have if we had brushed the Rebs away and cut the Savannah and Charleston Rail Road, as we could have done under an efficient commander."

Confederate viewpoints reflect the positive outcome of the battle. Smith praised his troops writing, "I have never seen or known of a battlefield upon which there was so little confusion, and where every order was so cheerfully and promptly obeyed, and where a small number of men for so long a time successfully resisted the determined and oft-repeated efforts of largely superior attacking forces."

Lt. Col. Charles C. Jones Jr., in his book Siege of Savannah, opines, "The victory at Honey Hill released the city of Savannah from an impending danger, which, had it not thus been averted, would have necessitated its immediate evacuation."

Historical Assessment of the Union Campaign. Looking back on the battle, CPT Luis F. Emilio wrote in his regimental history of the 54th MA, "It would seem with the light of the present that our position was as strong for us to hold as was the enemy's. This granted, the natural criticism is, would not the battle have been better fought to have held the position with a portion of our troops and pushed out the main body well on one flank or the other, drawing the enemy from his work to fight us and preserve his communications?"

Almost twenty years later on 10 and 17 May 1884, CPT Charles C. Soule, 55th MA, wrote an article for the Philadelphia Weekly Times. An eyewitness to the battle, he listed the following shortcomings of the Union leadership.

Port Royal, South Carolina on the Broad River and the base of operations for this campaign was captured on 7 November 1861. A little over three years later, the Coast Division sailed up the Broad River in heavy fog with one competent pilot to lead the invasion fleet to Boyd's Landing. Elements of the fleet ascended the wrong rivers, ran aground or waited for the fog to clear before arriving at Boyd's Landing later in the day on 29 November. When they did land, they had no accurate maps of the area of operations to guide them quickly to their objective, the Savannah & Charleston Railroad at Grahamville. Consequently, they wondered around lost the rest of the day and into the night, missing the best opportunity to destroy the railroad.

Reconnoitering US Navy expeditions ascending the river during the three years of occupation would have trained more pilots and familiarized them with the soundings and rivers to avert the problems encountered with the fog. These expeditions could have also carried US Army scouts or engineers to reconnoiter the surrounding road network to create accurate maps. In fact, many slaves in the area of operations "rallied to the colors" and jointed the USCT regiments that operated in the area of operations. These ex-slaves could have been used to guide the leading elements of the invasion.

On the morning of the battle, 30 November, Potter's 1st Brigade was under orders to march before daylight to Grahamville and destroy the railroad. The march began at 0900 instead, letting the 3rd SC Cavalry and Zealy's artillery section get in position to fight a two and one-half hour delaying action that allowed the Confederates to occupy the Honey Hill position just ahead of the Union forces. Perhaps Potter's men were still exhausted from the prior day of marching and counter-marching which finally ended at 0200 on the day they were to advance. Perhaps he was waiting for his artillery or COL Hartwell's 2nd Brigade (Colored) to appear before proceeding. Whatever the reason, another opportunity was missed to advance unopposed toward Grahamville. A battle might still have been fought but it would have been fought beyond the fortifications of Honey Hill in more open terrain.

CPT Soule went on to criticize the "irresolution" of the reaction to the Confederate delaying action, the "inaction which left a line of battle without orders and made no systematic attempt at reconnoitering and turning the enemy's flanks", and the "bad judgment which ordered" (or allowed) "single regiments to charge successively by a narrow road upon a strongly fortified position, defended by artillery and infantry". The blame rested on Hatch "who was present at the front and directed operations during the day."

In January 1865, Sherman toured the battlefield with Hatch and asked him, "Hatch, why in hell didn't you flank them on their right?" MG Jacob D. Cox summed up the battle in his 1898 volume, Sherman's March to the Sea-Campaigns of the Civil War series; "It was a fresh instance of the manner in which irresolute leadership in war wasted the lives of men by alternation between an ill-timed caution and an equally illtimed rashness."



It is easy to criticize the leadership of Hatch and he deserves much of it. However, remember the muddled orders that Halleck passed on to Foster, Hatch's commander, "...at all events a demonstration on that road will be of advantage." In his mind, Hatch may have believed that he carried out his orders by demonstrating and drawing Confederate forces away from Sherman's March to the Sea. He certainly fought the battle as if it were a demonstration. The 754 Union casualties represent 16% (754/4,720) of the committed force, a high percentage for a demonstration. If Hatch thought he was conducting a demonstration, he apparently didn't keep his subordinates "well in hand" as they attempted to fight a battle.

Historical Assessment of the Confederate Defense. Defending is less complex than attacking and defending behind entrenchments is even less so. The attacker has to coordinate his attacks for the best, overwhelming effect while the defender must react, parry the assaults by committing and maneuvering reserves for the best defensive effect. The Union did not coordinate and conduct their attacks in such a manner that stretched and overwhelmed the Confederates to their breaking point.

The Confederates took advantage of the Union mistakes and conducted an excellent defense of their position. The delaying action was inspired, the coordination between the artillery and infantry was flawless and the spirit of the soldiers, exhausted as they were, was superb. Praising his opponents, Soule summed it up thus, "On their side it was all good generalship and good luck; on ours it was the reverse."

The Scenario

MG William T. Sherman's request for support read, "I would like to have General Foster to break the Savannah and Charleston road about Pocotaligo about 1 December." This scenario simulates the Union attack on the Confederate defensive position at Honey Hill, South Carolina and assumes that the original intent of Sherman's request was passed on to Foster through Halleck without embellishments or diminishments. It further assumes that Foster briefed Hatch, the Coast Division commander, who in turn thoroughly briefed his infantry, artillery and naval commanders of the campaign's operational objective and tactical plans.

The Union has 21 turns to maneuver through difficult terrain and drive the Confederates from their defensive position. The Confederates must quickly shift their forces to meet the Union assaults on their position and prevent the capture of the Honey Hill artillery redoubt

Terrain

Map Scale. The map is scaled for 15mm miniatures at 12" (300 yards) per grid-square making the scenario map .85 X 1.19 mile or a 5' X 7' table. I game with Baccus 6mm miniatures and its easy to convert the map scale from 15mm to 6mm. Using the map legend, draw a 440--yard grid over the map. In 6mm scale, each 440-yard (1/4 mile) grid-square represents 12" or a 3'5" X 4'9" table. The black portions of the Confederate fortifications shown on the map still exist.

Game Scale. Infantry and cavalry stands (mounted or dismounted) = 40 men, gun stands = 2 guns, $1^{"} = 25$ yards (36.6 yards 6mm), 1 turn = 15 minutes.

Roads. All the roads are rated Poor. Units moving along the roads in march column or limbered move at the Open Ground rate. There is no "road bonus" rate. Line of sight is based upon the terrain around the road.

Honey Hill and Contour Lines. Honey Hill is rated Open Ground. Units defending in charge combat on higher ground will add one for Favorable Ground. Line of sight is based upon the terrain around Honey Hill but the hill itself can block the line of sight if higher ground is positioned between units. The contour line running along the Confederate battle line does not block line of sight. Line of sight is based upon the terrain around the contour line.


Euhaw Creek and Streams. The Euhaw Creek and the two streams are rated Broken Ground. All infantry and dismounted cavalry or dismounted leaders may cross the creek and streams at any location. Dismounted cavalry or dismounted leaders that cross a creek or stream may not remount until they return to the side of the creek or stream from which they dismounted.

Artillery (limbered or unlimbered and hand hauled) and mounted cavalry or mounted leaders are prohibited from crossing the creek and streams. Euhaw Creek and the streams were wide (20 yards) and shallow (2 feet or less) with marshy ground extending on both sides. There are no intact bridges or fords on the Poor roads for artillery, mounted cavalry or mounted leaders to cross. Units defending in charge combat against an attacker that crossed a creek or stream add one for Favorable Ground. Line of sight is open.

Rifle-Pits. Rifle-pits are rated Broken Ground. Units in rifle-pits are considered in Full Cover and subtract two when targeted. Units defending in charge combat add two for Strong Position. Line of sight is based upon the terrain around the rifle-pits.

Artillery Redoubts. The two artillery redoubts are rated Broken Ground. The large artillery redoubt was 400 feet wide and open to the rear (technically, it was a redan) and was located about 100 yards from Euhaw Creek. A maximum of 4 guns total (counting the 1/2 gun stands or a damaged gun stand as 1 gun each) may occupy the large redoubt and likewise, two guns may occupy the small northern redoubt. Guns fire with their normal 15-degree arc of fire and may pivot normally to fire from within the redoubt. The artillery redoubts are considered a Fortified Position and subtract three when targeted. Units defending in charge combat against attackers charging a redoubt add two for Fortified Position and add one for Favorable Ground if defending higher ground. Note: This is an exception to the rule stating that these modifiers are not cumulative. Guns can also add one for Supported Guns or subtract one for Unsupported Guns. Guns may also be supported in charge combat by an infantry unit in line of battle within 2" (1.5" 6mm) behind the guns and count their numbers in the Outnumbered calculation. Confederate infantry units






can occupy an artillery redoubt if there are no artillery units in the redoubt. Line of sight is based upon the terrain around the redoubts.

Open Pine Forest. Open pine forests are rated Broken Ground. Units in extended line are considered in Full Cover and subtract two when targeted. Other units are considered in Partial Cover and subtract one when targeted. Units defending

in charge combat add one for Favorable Ground against attackers charging through open pine forests. Line of sight is limited to 10° (7.5" 6mm) when passing through open pine forest.

Thick Forest. Thick forests are rated Rough Ground. All units may move through thick forests but artillery must be unlimbered and hand hauled through thick forest, 2" (1.5") per turn, leaving the limber behind on a road. Gun stands



hand hauled away from their limbers are considered fixed guns in charge combat. Units in extended line are considered in Full Cover and subtract two when targeted. Other units and unlimbered or hand hauled artillery subtract one for Partial Cover when targeted. Units defending in charge combat add one for Favorable Ground against attackers charging through thick forest. Line of sight is limited to 4" (3" 6mm) when passing through thick forest.

Swamps. Swamps are rated Rough Ground for all infantry, dismounted cavalry and dismounted leaders. Swamps are rated Impassible Terrain for artillery (limbered or unlimbered and hand hauled) and mounted cavalry and mounted leaders. Dismounted cavalry and dismounted leaders that cross a swamp may not remount until they return to the side of the swamp from which they dismounted. Units in extended line are considered in Full Cover and subtract two when targeted. Other units are considered in Partial Cover and subtract one when targeted. Units defending in charge combat add one for Favorable Ground against attackers charging through swamps. Line of sight is limited to 10" (7.5" 6mm) when passing through swamp.

"The Crossroads." Union artillery may unlimber at the Crossroads of the Grahamville and Wood Roads and can only target the artillery redoubt on Honey Hill. A maximum of 4 guns total (counting a damaged gun stand as 1 gun) can be deployed at the Crossroads. Union artillery at the Crossroads may fire over their own infantry on lower ground to target Honey Hill.

Leader Command Radius. The Leader Command Radius is 8" (6" 6mm) for mounted leaders with a clear line of sight to a unit. Command Radius is reduced to 4" (3" 6mm) for attached leaders, dismounted leaders or a line of sight passing through thick forest.

Friendly Map Edge. Broken Union units must retreat toward the eastern map edge between roads A and C and stop at the edge. Broken Confederate units must retreat toward the northern or western map edge between roads D and E and stop at the edge. If a Broken unit that halted at the table edge fails to Reform in the next Maneuver Phase, its remaining stands are removed from play and count towards Heavy Casualties and Greater Loses.

Order of Battle

The following number of stands is needed:

STAND	UNION	CONFEDERATE
Infantry	98	53
Infantry command	13	10
Cavalry	0	7
Cavalry command	0	2
Dismounted cavalry	0	6
Dismounted cavalry command	d 0	2
Horse holder	0	1
Artillery (with limbers)	7	7

Division leader	1	1
Brigade or artillery leader	5	5
Dismounted leaders	4	5
Brave colonel (dismounted)	1	0
Ammo Wagon (small arms)	1	0
Total	130	94
Total combat arms stands	118	79

Union Forces. Total Combat Arm Stands represent a force of 4,720 men with 14 guns. All Union forces start the game on the board except for the reinforcements that are shown on the Honey Hill Time & Reinforcement Chart. They appear at the designated time at the designated entry road (A) in march column or limbered. Union infantry and artillery reinforcements may delay their entry and appear at Road B two turns later or Road C three turns later in march column or limbered.

Confederate Forces. Total Combat Arm Stands represent a force of 3,120 men with 12 guns. All Confederate forces start the game on the board except for the reinforcements that are shown on the Honey Hill Time & Reinforcement Chart. They appear at the designated time at the designated entry road (D or E) in march column or limbered.

Victory Conditions

One side must achieve more victory conditions than their opponent to claim victory. Inflicting Heavy Causalities, Greater Losses and capturing a Key Position are victory conditions as follows:

Heavy Casualties. The Union player achieves one victory condition if Confederate forces lose 20 troop and gun stands (25%). The Confederate player achieves one victory condition if Union forces lose 24 troops and gun stands (20%). After an army reaches its threshold for Heavy Casualties, all units subtract one in subsequent maneuver checks.

Greater Losses. A second victory condition is achieved after an army reaches both its Heavy Casualties threshold and is also suffering Greater Losses than the enemy. Subtract two from the maneuver check for as long as this condition lasts.

Key Position Lost. The Honey Hill artillery redoubt (X) is a Key Position. One side achieves one victory condition if at the end of the game they were the last side to have friendly units occupying the Honey Hill artillery redoubt.

In addition to being a victory condition, each turn after all Confederate units are pushed out of the large artillery redoubt, all Confederate units subtract one in subsequent maneuver checks. If all Union units are pushed out of the artillery redoubt in a later turn, the modifier is reversed and all Union units subtract one in subsequent maneuver checks. The subtract one modifier always applies to the last side to lose the Honey Hill artillery redoubt.

Special Scenario Rules

Ammunition Supply. Ammunition supply. Confederate units cannot replenish ammunition after suffering a low on



ammunition effect. Union infantry units can replenish small arms ammunition (only) after suffering a low on ammunition effect by being on a road and within 12" (9" 6mm) of the ammunition wagon or within 4" (3" 6mm) in the woods. The small arms ammunition wagon arrives on turn 10 at road A and only moves on roads at the rate of 12" (8" 6mm) per turn.

Sailor and Marine Battalions. The Union Sailor and Marine Battalions may only form two formations, march column or extended line. They were given one or two days (maybe) of infantry training prior to sailing and their mission was to provide infantry support for the Naval Battery.

Unit Labels

Unit Chain of Command. The chain of command is represented by label color. Each brigade (X) leader and all of the units he commands have the same color. The division (XX) leader's label has color bands for each of the brigades or units he commands. The three artillery leaders (Arty Ldr) in the game can only command same color gun sections. They cannot provide Provisional Command to infantry, cavalry or other artillery units of a different color band.

Unit Name and Size. The name of the unit is identified on the top of the label, often followed by the unit size: XX division, X brigade, II battalion, I company or a letter (B, 3 NY) representing a battery. Gun labels represent a two-gun section and each gun stand has a label. Often the name of the commander is the unit ID. If there is no unit size shown, it represents a regiment (III).

Unit Experience. There are three levels of unit experience in the scenario, from highest to lowest:

All unit types-infantry, cavalry and artillery-have a unit experience level and all three levels are die roll modifiers on the Maneuver, Musketry & Cannonade and Charge tables. There are no Green (Grn) units in the scenario.

Crack	Veteran	Trained
Crk)	(Vet)	(Trn)
54 MA	56 NY	Marine II
Crk RM	Vet RM	Trn RM
864	1196	5//4
1-1//.55	1-1//.55	1-1//.55
Turn 6 @ A		

Weapon Type: Small Arms. There are three small arms weapon types in the scenario: Rifle Musket (RM), Rifle Carbine (RC) and Smoothbore Musket (SM). Small arms in the rules have up to four range bands, 4"--8"--12"--16" (3"--6"--9"--12" 6mm).

The white label below the unit label shows the fire point value at each range band for each stand in the unit. Close range fire points are shown in red while long-range fire points follow the "//" and are shown in black.

Rifled Musket (RM)	Rifled Carbine (RC)	•	Smooth Bore Musket (SM)
32 GA Vet RM 653	3 SC Vet Dismounted	RC 653	157 NY Vet SM 432
1-1//.55	1-1//.5-0		1//.5-0-0

Weapon Type: Guns. There are three gun types in the game: Light Howitzer (LH), Heavy Howitzer (HH) and Heavy Smoothbore (HS). Guns in the scenario fire up to three, four or five of the six range bands, 4"--12"--36"--48"--60"--72" (3"--9"--27"--36"--45"--54" 6mm).


Gun batteries contain 2 or 3 stands each representing a twogun section with a label. The white label below the unit label shows the fire point value at each range band for each gun stand. Close range / canister fire points are shown in red while long-range fire points follow the "//" and are shown in black. Note: Scruggs' Section-1 consists of one HH (1/2) and section-2 consists of one HS (1/2) and both fire with 1/2 fire points (rounded down). If damaged, they are removed from the game and count toward the Victory Conditions of Heavy Casualties and Greater Loses.

		Heavy
		Smooth
Light	Heavy	Bore
Howitzer	Howitzer	Howitzer
(LH)	(HH)	(HS)
	()	(113)
Naval	Scruggs	Scruggs
	Scruggs	
Naval	Scruggs	Scruggs

Unit Effectiveness. There are three levels of unit effectiveness from highest to lowest: Fresh – Worn - Spent. These levels are expressed with the numbers on the unit label (8--6--4). The 8 represents the number of 40 man stands when the unit is Fresh at the start of the scenario (8 stands X 40 men = 320 man unit). As stands are lost during the game, a unit will become Worn when it reaches 6 stands and Spent when the unit has 4 or less stands remaining. All three levels of unit effectiveness are die roll modifiers on the Maneuver and Charge tables. Infantry and cavalry are rated for unit effectiveness but guns are not.

Regimental Battalions. The 127 NY is split into two battalions, (A) and (B). For ease of maneuver, split 15-plus stand regiments into two equal battalions. Treat both of them as independent regiments in all respects.

127 NY (A)	127 NY (B)
Vet RM	Vet RM
864	864
1-1//.55	1-1//.55



Dismounted Leaders. Terrain and victory conditions encourage Union players to dismount leaders and move them across the Euhaw Creek, streams and swamp. Included is a set of leader labels for both players to prepare dismounted leader stands. Mounting or dismounting is free of movement cost. Dismounted labels are not included for Hatch-not likely to dismount; for Brave Colonels-already dismounted or artillery leaders-guns cannot cross the creek, streams or swamp.


Miscellaneous. Two Quick Reference Sheets (QRS) are supplied with the rules and have the fire point values and range bands for both musketry and cannonade. The information below the unit labels was added to speed the game for players and Game Master. If the labels are considered too cluttered, just trim them off when the labels are mounted.

The "jagged" appearance of the Order of Battle Labels was necessary to emphasize the Fresh – Worn – Spent numbers using Ariel Black (21 pixels) verses the standard height (18 pixels) of the other rows. To do this, the 21 pixel rows in Excel had to be aligned.


Leader labels are taller to avoid showing the white sticky side of the Avery address labels used to mount them underneath the circular leader bases.


Game Length

The game is played in 21 turns starting with the Union player turn at 1200 and ending with the Confederate player turn at 1700. The weather is clear and hot. Sunset (twilight) is 1715.



Honey Hill Confederate Order of Battle






Honey Hill Time and Reinforcement Chart

All reinforcements enter on the road in march column or limbered.

Before the game starts, the Union players must commit the entire 2nd Brigade to enter at Road A, B, or C. If Road B or C is chosen, the 2nd Brigade reinforcements are each delayed one turn.

Robertson's Command enters on turn 6 at E in order of march: infantry - cavalry - artillery.

Turn	Time	Union Phase Move First	Confederate Phase Move Second
1	1200		
2	1215	COL Hartwell, 55 MA at A	
3	1230	102 USCT at A	3 SC Cavalry at D
4	1245	54 MA at A	
5	1300	Ammunition Wagon at A	
6	1315		BG Robertson's Command at E
7	1330	LCD Matthews, Naval Battery at A	Carden and a story and reaction when
8	1345		a start of the second starting of the second starting of the
9	1400		
10	1415		
11	1430		I ROMA
12	1445		
13	1500		and the second second second second



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Visit the web-site listed below for written after action reports of the battle, orders of battle, personal accounts of the battle, a summary description of the battle, a complete listing of Union casualties, maps and diagrams, photographs and links to related web-sites.

http://www.dcnyhistory.org/gary/hhbattle.html

