


Chinese Expeditionary Force ('Y' Force)
Yunnan Province, China, 1943 to 1945 (ab)
 Lieutenant General Wei Li-huang




(a) The Chinese Expeditionary Force was originally sent to Burma in early 1942 in order to protect Chinese supply lines. US Lend-Lease supplies came to China via the 'Burma Road' from the Burmese town of Lashio, which was connected by railway and river to the port of Rangoon. The protection of this main supply route was absolutely critical to Chiang Kai-Shek's war effort. However, the 1942 campaign ended disastrously, with the British-Indian army forced back into India and the Chinese Expeditionary Force split in two. General Stilwell, the overall Theatre Commander for Chinese forces, escaped to Ledo in India's Assam Province with a portion of the Chinese Expeditionary Force (mainly 22nd & 38th Divisions, plus other elements). The rest of the Chinese Expeditionary Force retreated back across the Salween, to China's Yunnan Province. Eventually, the Chinese Forces in India were designated 'X' Force, while those in China were designated 'Y' Force. Thankfully, the Japanese were too busy pacifying the vast country of Burma to pursue either force, so the Chinese were able to rebuild their strength. 'X' Force had direct access to British supply lines, so was able to build up to a powerful force of four divisions, equipped to modern standards. 'Y' Force on the other hand, only had access to whatever supplies the USAAF could fly over 'The Hump' of the Himalaya. With the aid of US advisors and some limited supplies of modern weapons, 'Y' Force managed to make some improvements in training, command and control, but nowhere near the advances made in 'X' Force.

(b) Although called 'Armies', the Chinese Armies, like those of the Japanese, were actually Corps in terms of organisation. However, in terms of combat strength, Chinese Armies were only equivalent to a British/Indian Division. Chinese Divisions meanwhile, were the strength of British/Indian Brigades.


(a) There is a little confusion here, as the Chinese 1st Infantry Regiment is also listed as serving with 'Mars' Force at this time.




Chinese XI Group Army, 'Y' Force, 1943-45
Lieutenant General Sung His-lien




Chinese XX Group Army, 'Y' Force, 1943-45
 Lieutenant General Huo Kuei-chang





(a) Chinese Armies, like those of the Japanese, were really just Corps in terms of organisational level (i.e. comprising 2-3 divisions), though in terms of combat strength were equivalent to a British/Indian Division.

(b) Each Army in 1944 was furnished with a single Light Artillery Battalion at Army level. By April 1944 the USA had supplied enough 75mm Pack Howitzers to also add a Light Artillery Battalion to each Division. Presumably these new divisional battalions were trained and absorbed into the divisions during the campaign 'lull' of the Monsoon Season (roughly June to September) and were ready for the resumption of operations in October 1944.



(a) Most Chinese divisions in 'Y' Force were very weak in all regards, being regarded as being equivalent in strength to a British/Indian Brigade, though weaker in motor transport, weapons, ammunition, food, leadership, and training. The training and leadership issues were partly addressed through the attachment of 'Y-FOS' liaison teams, who were present in 10-20 man units at Regiment, Division and Army level. The weapons, ammunition and food issues were addressed by the USAAF who provided an astonishing amount of materiel throughout 1943 and 1944, until the Burma Road was re-opened at the end of 1944. The motor transport issue was never really resolved until the Burma Road was re-opened and 'Y' Force consequently had no armour, no artillery heavier than 75mm, very few trucks and only a few Jeeps.

(b) The US Army Y-FOS liaison team attached to the divisional headquarters may also function as a Forward Air Controller unit, or as a Forward Observer unit for Army or Divisional artillery.


(c) Given the terrain and the chronic lack of transport, even senior commanders travelled by foot. However, some units might have been lucky. May therefore transport these elements using:

Cavalry	CH-17
Jeep (no MG)	CH-P10

(d) Chinese Infantry Regiments were generally only the strength of battalions and the battalions were therefore only the strength of companies. However, US training and communications equipment had resolved some of the earlier command and control problems and gave the Chinese much greater tactical flexibility.

(e) It isn't clear how anti-tank guns were organised. We have decided to group them at divisional level, but it may have been the case that they were allocated in platoon-sized units at regimental level, or as individual gun sections at battalion level.



(f) Chinese Divisions initially had only a battery of 82mm mortars at divisional level, in lieu of divisional artillery. However, these were supplemented from mid-1944 by the addition of a divisional Light Artillery Battalion.




(a) May be mounted on horseback. May therefore replace with: Cavalry CH-17

(b) The US Army Y-FOS liaison team attached to the regimental headquarters may also function as a Forward Air Controller unit, or as a Forward Observer unit for Army or Divisional artillery.

(c) In 1942 there was also a Mortar Company at regimental level, equipped with Russian 82mm mortars. However, no additional 82mm mortars or ammunition had been supplied to Nationalist China and there is no evidence for US 81mm mortars being supplied in sufficient numbers to establish Regimental Mortar Companies. It therefore seems unlikely that the regiments of 'Y' Force were still able to maintain a Mortar Company in 1944.



(a) By the opening of the 1944 offensive, the USAAF had only supplied enough Bren LMGs to equip x1 Infantry squad per company. By the middle of 1944 there were enough Brens to equip roughly x3 Infantry squads per company.



(a) The company may be split up as direct unit attachments to the battalion's other companies.


(b) At the opening of the 1944 offensive, there were only enough 60mm Mortars to equip the Mortar Squads of the Infantry Companies. However, by the middle of 1944, there were sufficient 60mm Mortars to add a Mortar Squad to the Battalion MG Companies.


(c) The Boys Anti-Tank Rifle stats are the 1942-45 stats listed on card CH-16 (yes, we know they're worse than the earlier stats!). From mid-1944: Increase to x2 Boys Anti-Tank Rifle.




(a) The company may be split up as direct unit attachments to the division's other BGs and MEs.

(b) As far as we are aware, the M1 37mm Anti-Tank Gun was not designed to be broken down into mule-loads. It is however possible that some units obtained motor transport, in which case replace limbers with: Jeep (no MG) CH-P10





(a) The Mortar Battery may be split up as individual unit attachments to MEs or BGs in the Division. Note that the Chinese lack the fire control techniques and signals capability to perform true Indirect Fire, so the unit lacks FOs and may only engage targets during preparatory barrages or those that are visible to the mortar crew.



(a) The battalion, or individual batteries, may be split up as individual unit or battery attachments to MEs or BGs within the Army or Division.

(b) May replace Jeep gun-tractors with:
 Pack Mules

Close Air Support

Close air support for 'Y' Force was provided by the USAAF's 14th Air Force and specifically the 51st Fighter Group (16th, 25th & 26th Fighter Squadrons) throughout 1944 and 1945. The 51st Fighter Group was equipped with P-40N Warhawks until 1945, when it converted to P-51A Mustangs. We are not aware of any other Fighter Groups providing close air support for 'Y' Force.

Most unusually, the unit is reported as attacking with rockets in 1944 – possibly unique armament for a P-40 unit?

